All Work: An Evaluation of Worker\u27s Attitudes, Worker\u27s Behavior and Productivity in the U.S. Automobile Industry by Baker, Todd M.R.
Oberlin 
Digital Commons at Oberlin 
Honors Papers Student Work 
1990 
All Work: An Evaluation of Worker's Attitudes, Worker's Behavior 
and Productivity in the U.S. Automobile Industry 
Todd M.R. Baker 
Oberlin College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Repository Citation 
Baker, Todd M.R., "All Work: An Evaluation of Worker's Attitudes, Worker's Behavior and Productivity in the 
U.S. Automobile Industry" (1990). Honors Papers. 575. 
https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors/575 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Digital Commons at Oberlin. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Honors Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Oberlin. For 
more information, please contact megan.mitchell@oberlin.edu. 
ALLWORK 
An evaluation of worker's attitudes, worker's behavior 






The American automobile industry has become extremely sensitive to 
the increased number of Japanese cars and plants in the United States. 
Some parties believe that in order to operate competitively in the future 
labor and management must continue to find ways to work together and 
improve relations. Irving Bluestone, a former labor leader, believes that 
humanistic relations between the two parties are essential to the welfare 
of everyone involved. Joint efforts between the workers and management 
need to be continued and expanded. Both sides can benefit from such 
cooperation. 1 
One method of exploring the importance of labor-management 
relations in the automobile industry is to examine worker's behavior and 
its relationship with productivity. The simple notion, the happier a worker 
is the more productive is his or her work, can be expanded and thought of in 
greater detail. One can try to measure workers attitudes through 
behavioral indicators and observe whether or not they have any measurable 
effect on production. In the past ten years economists have tested several 
different theories in an attempt to explain how worker's attitudes might 
affect productivity. This topic presents some empirical problems since 
2 
there is a difficulty in creating accurate measures of workers attitudes 
and collecting information that explains them properly. 
Thomas Kochan seems to have been the pioneer in the field of 
estimating models to explain the effects of worker's behavior on 
productivity. He worked with Harry Katz and Kenneth Gobielle on a few 
studies which analyze the relationship between labor management 
relations, (measured using plant level data), and economic performance 
(measured using productivity and quality figures) in the automobile 
industry and some other manufactures.2 On a more aggregated level, J.R. 
Norsworthy and Craig Zabala have done a study using industry wide 
data(the automobile industry) instead of plant-level data. They try to 
capture the effects of worker's attitudes on productivity by analyzing the 
relationship between worker behavior and costs.3 
Both sets of studies produce interesting findings and raise intriguing 
questions. By examining some of the same theories at the plant and 
industry level, the authors have tested similar hypothesis at different 
levels. Due to certain time constraints with collecting plant-level data I 
have chosen to test an industry level approach similar to Norsworthy's and 
3 
Zabala's study. They test a restricted model explaining total unit cost 
against the unrestricted one which includes a worker behavior index. They 
find that the unrestricted model is better at explaining costs and that 
negative worker attitudes have a positive influence on costs. I will test 
some of the same hypotheses and correlations using different measures 
for, and construction of, the worker attitudes index. This change will 
attempt to present a framework for a better understanding of the 
industrial worker. 
WORKERS 
For years the plant worker was told simply to show up for work, do 
what he or she was told, and go home. No input, other than performing his 
or her duty, was asked from the individual. Labor management relations 
were much like those between the dictator and his or her people. People at 
the top would take care of any problems and implement needed changes. 
Workers were thought of by management as hands performing a simple task 
in a large operation. However, management began to realize that 
shop-floor workers could perform additional duties that would save the 
operation money in the long run. For example in 1979, Ford Motor Company 
started a quality of working life program which promoted active 
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participation by the worker. Workers were encouraged to discuss problems 
and how they thought some processes could be improved. A notion of 
"team" was introduced with workers forming groups to accomplish certain 
tasks. However, many of the programs were implemented without 
realizing the concerns and fears of the worker. 
A major concern of most workers is the stability of their job. 
Actions that might lead to job loss require a great deal of thought before 
they are done. Challenging management or leading a team" might, in the 
long run, lead to a firing. It is difficult for the worker to know who to 
trust when a job is in the balance. This fear of losing a job would perhaps 
cause a worker not to behave in a certain way in response to an attitude. 
If this hypothesis is true, then behavioral measures must be chosen 
carefully to try to accurately predict attitudes. 
Therefore, a more content worker might be more productive but what 
must be investigated is the attitude that makes the worker behave in a 
certain way. If we can find evidence that different types of behavior do 
have an effect on costs and productivity, then it would be advantageous to 
both management and labor to identify the attitudes. Labor-management 
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policy can then be designed to meet the needs of the workers, their 
attitudes, and some concerns of management, costs and productivity. 
What makes a worker quit his or her job? For what reasons do 
- workers file unfair labor practice cases? Why are people absent? 
Questions like these can then be examined jointly by labor and 
management. The key to the process is jOint effort. It is now clear how 
each component of the study is joined together. People's attitudes affect 
their behavior. This economic model will hopefully provide evidence as to 
if andlor how worker behavior affects costs. Then further study can be 
done to evaluate what the attitudes are and how they might be reshaped in 
an attempt to change behavior at the plant level. 
THE MODEL 
The essence of this model will follow closely to the one proposed by 
Norsworthy and Zabala in, Workers Attitudes, Worker BehaYior, And 
Worker Productivity In The U.S. Automobile Industry. 1959-1976.4 A 
standard cost function is used with the addition of a new variable, the 
worker behavior index, W. 
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TUC is the total unit cost of production; Pk represents the prices of 
capital (service not purchase price); PI represents the cost of production 
worker labor (based on the total hourly compensation package); Pn the cost 
of nonproduction worker labor; Pm the cost of materials (all other 
purchased inputs); W is a vector of worker attitudes; Y is the level of 
output; and TECH is a time trend representing technology.5 
The link between worker behavior and total unit productivity can be 
made through total unit cost. Total unit productivity moves in the opposite 
direction as total unit cost. Behavior that is linked to increasing total 
unit cost can also be thought of as decreasing total factor productivity and 
vice versa. By making this connection, a bridge can be drawn between 
macro and micro levels. On the macro level, industry wide data of worker 
behavior and other factors can be used to predict total unit cost and total 
factor productivity. Knowing this, micro work can be done looking at the 
factors that make the workers behave in certain ways. As mentioned 
before, combining these two levels provides necessary information for 
policy makers. 
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THE TRANSLOG COST FUNCTION 
To estimate the model, a translog cost function specification is 
used. The translog specification is used instead of a more specialized 
production function such as the Cobb-Douglas because, "it permits variable 
elasticities of substitution both between pairs of inputs and through 
time ... 6 The restricted or uncorrected model is the previously mentioned 
cost function without the variables representing worker attitudes; 
and the other variables are as defined above.7 
All the automobile industry data from 1959-1976 used in the 
restricted model was obtained from Norsworthy and Zabala.8 They 
obtained them mostly from national income accounts and the Annual Survey 
of Manufactures. Combing the notation and the trans log specification, 
yields the following equation for the restricted model: 
InC = ao +"£iai'nPi + 1I2£'i..fjaijlnPi'nPj + aT T 
+ £'a'TTlnP' + 1/2anT2 I I I 
where i, j = k,n,I,m. 
The reasons for using these parameters are like the ones given by 
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Norsworthy and Zabala. The first parameter of the equation, ao, is the 
constant in the equation. The next parameter, ai, captures the effect of i 
taken individually. The parameter, aU' describes the relationship between 
each of the four price inputs. It allows for the possibility that input 
factors may be substituted in different degrees for one another. The 
parameter, aT, allows for technological change using a time trend (T = 
1,2,3, ...... ). The parameter, aiT, corrects for varying factor usage 
throughout the study that is not captured by the other parameters in the 
model. 9 My measurement of InC differs from theirs in that it represents 
u-U-,UC)f 
the indexed unit cost of an automobile instead of the ~ cost. Since 
indexed unit prices of inputs are being used on the right hand side of the 
equation, it seems appropriate to use the same type of measurement on the 
left hand side. 
The translog cost function is a more general case than the 
Cobb-Douglas. I believe it is appropriate to use the translog function in 
this case because it includes the aij variable that allows varying degrees 
of substitution between the input factors. The Cobb-Douglas could be used 
in this model but the translog, because it is more general, seems to be 
9 
better suited to capture the costs involved in this industry. 
In addition to the translog cost function, share equations for each 
input are estimated. They take the form of: 
where i, j = k, I, n, m; Si = PiXjlLiPiXi; and Xi is the quantity of the ith 
input. The existence of the share equations helps in gaining some degrees 
of freedom for the model because Zellner's method of seemingly unrelated 
equations can be used on the cost function and the share equations 
collectively. 1 0 (For further explanation of the application of Zellner's 
method in this model see appendix E.) 
In another attempt to gain degrees of freedom, cross equation 
restrictions implied by cost minimization theory are placed on the 
parameters. By imposing symmetry, these restriction are created: 
a·· - a·· Ij - JI where i, j = k, I, n, m. 
on the parameters to be estimated in the cost function. A kl or an Ik 
represents the same parameter. This would seem to make sense as the 
relationship between the capital input and the labor input does not change 
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due to the order in which they are presented.11 It also decreases the 
number of parameters to be estimated thus allowing for a greater degrees 
of freedom. To impose homogeneity, which corrects for an un/nary 
series, on the prices of inputs the restriction: 
£'jai = 1, and £jaij = 0, where i, j = k, I, n, m.12 
ti' 
is placed t?~ the cost function. For the same reasoning, the restriction: 
£"'iaiT = 0 where i, j = k, I, n, m and T = Tech.13 
is placed on each one of the share equations. These two restrictions also 
reduce the number of estimated parameters, which increases degrees of 
freedom. 
Estimation of the restricted model is now possible. Enforcing these 
restrictions, allows only three of the four share equations to be estimated 
along with the cost function. Therefore, the estimation method using 
Zellner's method of seemingly unrelated equations is run with four 
equations. To assure that the restrictions do not impose too much of a 
bias the model is estimated eliminating different share equations with 
each try. If the results are reasonably consistent from one try to another 
it can be assumed that the restrictions are all right to impose on the 
model. Norsworthy and Zabala found that the choice was indeed 
1 1 
insignificant.14 I will test the model four times eliminating a different 
share equation each time. I am using different measures than Norsworthy 
and Zabala and therefore want to insure that the results will also be 
similar regardless which share equation is eliminated. 
Although I believe the translog function is the appropriate equation to 
follow in this model because of its generality, it seems that a more 
restricted version of the equation with and without the w variables should 
be estimated. Therefore the model will also be estimated eliminating all 
the interactive input terms to examine a more specific case. Comparing 
the results from this equation and the translog will be helpful in trying to :J. rf/'t'f ~! 1-£ '-
bt'sf f 6S9 b ~ r 
predict the best possible eqt:Jatien. rtiil(ch;"J wi'h, c< S ,(tAl 
I i. .! 
Lk-i ,'./,# Cl! ~ ( (~.r-s;h'l. 
THE W VARIABLE 
With discussion of the restricted model complete, the construction of 
the W variable and the unrestricted model is necessary. The variables that 
makeup the workers behavior index and its construction are where this 
study and Norsworthy's and Zabala's differ. Their index takes the form; 
Iw = g(G, U, Q, Z) 
where G is the number of grievances filed in the previous year; U is the 
12 
number of unresolved grievances at the end of the previous year; Q is the 
number of voluntary separations (quits); and Z is the number of 
unauthorized strikes (strikes undertaken without the sanction of the 
international union).15 They obtain the value of the index after estimating 
its parameters as part of the system of factor-share equations and the 
cost function.16 
They obtain the information for these variables from various sources 
and give different reasons for using each one. Their first reason is that 
these are the variables that have been studied most often by researchers in 
the industrial relations field, several sources are cited.17 They discuss 
some of the measures that Katz, Kochan, and Zabala use saying how some 
of their measures are proxies or have more explanatory power. Katz, 
Kochan, and Zabala use extensive measures most of which are taken from 
plant-level surveys. Norsworthy and Zabala obtain the quits data from a 
published report by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for SIC industry 
371 . Information on G and U are collected from proprietary sources and 
represent less than one half of the industry (they are both lagged one year). 
Z is also collected from proprietary sources representing almost all of the 
production workers in the industry. 
13 
There seems to be an element of contradiction in the way the 
information for the variables in Norsworthy's and Zabala's study were 
colJected. Both the grievance and unresolved grievance data represent 
about half of the industry and yet they are assumed to be representative of 
the entire group. The whole notion behind the theory is to take a 
macroeconomic examination of the situation using industry wide data. 
, 
They seem to violate this idea somewhat by using unrepresentative data 
for two of their four measures. Wildcat strikes also seem to weakly 
portray the attitudes of workers. Wildcat strikes are usually initiated 
within local unions and therefore do not seem to come close to accurately 
representing the true attitudes of all the workers in the industry. Quit 
rates seems to be a representative variable and one that is easily obtained. 
They also discuss variables that would have made for interesting 
measures but were not attainable, absenteeism for example. I also believe 
that this would have been an excellent measure because it is a behavior 
that seems to capture a workers unhappiness well, although there are 
several reasons why people are absent from work. However, I was also 
unable to obtain industry wide data for this measure. The number of 
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unable to obtain industry wide data for this measure. The number of 
employees in quality of working life programs or employee involvement 
programs also seems to be a reasonable measure of behavior. If a person 
chooses to partake in this type of program, it might suggest that he or she 
has a favorable attitude towards management and his or her job. One 
would expect that as the number of people in these types of programs 
increased, costs would decrease and productivity would increase. Like 
absenteeism, there is a great deal of literature on the subject but 
measures of levels of participation could not be obtained. 
Levels of unemployment also seemed like it might be a variable that 
would affect a worker's attitude and in turn his or her behavior. One could 
hypothesize that as unemployment rates increased people might be afraid 
of losing their jobs and react by working harder. This change in behavior 
would seem to decrease costs and increase productivity. Even though 
measures of unemployment are obtainable there are some reasons that 
might make them an inaccurate variable to include in the index. As 
unemployment increases, the workers who get told to leave first are 
usually the less experienced. This would cause the remaining work force 
to have a higher experience level. This increase would seem to cause a 
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decrease in costs and an increase in productivity. Therefore with the 
unemployment measure, it may be difficult to separate the few ways it 
might affect costs. 
I chose to represent the W index in this manner; Iw = g(OP, OR, UFL), 
where OP is an opportunity cost measure for workers ( the average weekly 
wage of a worker in all the industries included in manufacturing divided by 
the average weekly wage of a worker in the automobile industry); OR is a 
measure of quit rates per one thousand worker, the same one that is used 
by Norsworthy and Zabala; and UFL is a measure of unfair labor practices 
filed with the National Labor Relations Board against the employer per one 
thousand production workers. All measures are yearly and are taken for 
the automobile industry (SIC 371) as a whole. Unfair labor practice cases 
are taken from the National Labor Relations Annual Reports from 1959 to 
1976. Weekly wage measures are taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Employment. Hours. and Earnings. United States. 1909-84. 
The opportunity costs variable was derived from a similar notion 
developed by Hamermesh in Economic Aspects of Job Satisfaction. 18 
Hamermesh argues that job satisfaction can be linked to a person's 
16 
relative wage. The higher a worker's relative wage the more satisfied he 
or she will be with the job. He also argues that other factors affect job 
satisfaction but the relative wage measure is the idea that is considered 
in this model. 
Generally, the opportunity cost measure can be thought of as what a 
person is giving up by choosing to do the activity that he or she is 
currently engaged in, foregone opportunity. In this case it measures the 
wage an automobile worker currently receives in relation to what the 
worker can earn elsewhere with his or her skills. This measure can be 
thought of as something that affects the attitude of the worker. If one 
follows Hirschman's logic in Exit Voice and Loyalty 19, the opportunity cost 
measure could be considered an identifier for the worker to make the 
choice to exit, or stay and voice(complain), or just not work as 
productively. From talking to several workers, the last option can be 
pursued in several different ways. Since they get paid by the hour and not 
by some productivity measure like the number of parts per hour, workers 
might not move from one area to another as quickly as before or tell 
management about an improvement that could increase output. There are 
many examples such as these which are reactions to feeling dissatisfied. 
17 
This measure is a tool for the worker to judge if the management of 
the organization is compensating him or her fairly with respect to what 
others are being given for the use of roughly the same skills. This is a 
monetary identifier. If a worker believes that he or she is treated poorly 
by management in another manner besides monetarily, forced to work in 
poor working conditions for example, this would be a different kind of 
identifier. These signs taken collectively affect the workers attitude. If 
the worker is satisfied with his or her job then the signs probably identify 
that the worker feels that the compensation and other factors are 
adequate. A worker who feels he or she is being compensated fairly will 
probably not consider the options to exit or voice and might work more 
productively. 
In this model, as the measure increases the relative compensation of 
the automobile worker has decreased. (Obviously this is not an exact 
measure because workers are not interchangeable between all 
manufacturing jobs. However, this comparison seemed to be the most 
appropriate of all those that could have been made.) This would probably 
cause the worker to be less satisfied with his or her job. As mentioned 
18 
earlier, this reaction might cause costs to rise and productivity to 
decrease. 
A worker might feel the option to either exit or voice is not available. 
The exit option might not be reasonable because of the possibility that the 
worker might not get hired elsewhere and then be left with no income. 
Conversely, complaining might put the worke~s job in jepordy. Therefore, 
the only way to react to the dissatisfaction would be to change the way 
the job is done. If this is the case, then the opportunity cost variable 
might capture immeasurable behaviors that would cause a decrease in 
productivity. 
The unfair labor practice variable is an attempt to capture the voice 
option of the worker. A worker can file an unfair labor practice case for 
several reasons and they are classified in several categories. The reasons 
have to do with the employer infringing upon the ability of the worker to 
voice. In these cases, the employee or emloyees file because the employer 
has discriminated against a worker or workers for matters relating to 
labor organization. For example they do not allow workers to pass out 
meeting information in places where they are permitted, or put pressure on 
19 
people not to join unions are to join them. The employer is trying in some 
fashion to take away means for workers to voice about problems on the 
job. 
An increase in the number of filed cases, would seem to represent 
another example of negative attitudes among workers. Therefore, as 
mentioned earlier. the unfair labor practice variable is a measurable 
behavioral reaction that might cause costs to increase and productivity to 
decrease. 
The quit rates measure is an attempt to capture the exit option of the 
worker. Hirschman argues that when a consumer is not satisfied with a 
product he or she has the option to choose a different make or when a 
member of an organization is not satisfied with the group he or she can 
leave and join another one. Although it is easier to use the exit option in 
the cases mentioned above than with one's place of employment, quit rates 
would seem to be a way of measuring this alternative within the 
framework of labor-management relations in the automobile industry. 
Taken in the context of this model. an increase in quit rates would be 
20 
another indicator of negative attitudes among workers. Therefore, like 
unfair labor practices, an increase in quit rates is a measurable behavioral 
reaction that might cause increase costs an a decrease in productivity. 
In comparison to Norsworthy and Zabala's model, a new worker 
attitude-behavior framework has been created. The quit rate measure 
remains the same but is explained in a different context. However, the 
unfair labor practice measure and the opportunity cost measure capture 
very different notions than the grievance rates and strikes. Both 
grievances and wild cat strikes capture ways of voicing or complaining. 
Workers feel that the are not being treated fairly on the job and file a 
grievance to complain about a specific case or set a wild cat strike 
because they would like to complain collectively. Unfair labor practices do 
not measure the magnitude with which workers are complaining but 
instead the instances where the employer is trying to take away the voice 
option. By including the opportunity cost variable, I have try to capture 
those ways of behaving that are not measured or discussed in Norsworthy 
and Zabala's paper. In total, this new way of presenting workers attitudes 
and behaviors seems to more accurately account for the different ways a 
worker behaves in response to an attitude. Therefore, it would seem that 
21 
this model would be better at indicating how behavior affects cost and 
productivity . 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF W 
Norsworthy and Zabala believe that each variable of W interacts with 
the other and thus represents them in a translog worker behavior index: 
Inlw = ~ k bk Inrk + 1/2{k{1 bkllnrklnq 
with k, 1= G, U, Q, Z.I believe that this is a too exhaustive representation 
of W. It seems that a simple linear model is sufficient with the equation: 
It = aO + aqrWqrt + auflWuflt + aopWopt 
with QR, UFL, OP equal to the measures described previously. This 
representation is more like the one used by Katz, Kochan, and Gobielle. 
Although they use more variables, it still seems the appropriate method to 
represent them in this model. 
THE UNRESTRICTED MODEL 
Even though this model measures W differently from Norsworthy and 
Zabala, the unrestricted equation takes the same form. It is the translog 
cost function mentioned in the restricted model section with the addition 
of a few parameters measuring the effect W. The new cost function is 
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represented in this manner: 
InC = ao + ~iailnPj + 1/2(~ i £jajjlnPjlnPj) + aT T 
+ z iaiTlnPjT + 112 anT2 + aWW 
+ aTW TW + f. jaiWlnPiW 
where i, j = k, I ,n, m and W = the worker behavior index. The parameter aW 
represents how a change in W affects costs. The parameter aTW explains 
the interaction between technology and Wand aiW represents the 
interaction between Wand each jnput factor.20 
Similar to the test on the restricted model, the cost function is 
estimated along with the three corresponding share equations. A different 
share equation is eliminated with each test due to the restrictions on the 
model. The share equations in the unrestricted model are like those 
described in the restricted model with the addition of a iwW term. With 
both models in order, most importantly I want to find out which one is 
better at explaining costs. To do this, I will conduct an f-test using the 
R2 statistic from the restricted and unrestricted models. 
23 
THE RESULTS 
Both the restricted and the unrestricted model were estimated using 
Zellner's model of seemingly unrelated equations on the SAS statistical 
software package. The parameter estimates and their corresponding 
t-statistics are shown in appendix A, for the restricted model, and 
appendix B, for the unrestricted model, using the translog function and 
Appendix C, for the restricted model, and Appendix 0, for the unrestricted 
model, using the equation with no interactive terms, at the end of the 
paper. The results are shown for each test. There were four tests 
eliminating a different share equation each time. The results are similar 
regardless of which share equation is eliminated which suggests that the 
restrictions that are imposed on the model are robust. The R2 was 
calculated using the statistics from the test which eliminated the 
materials share equation. The R2 was .989 for the restricted model and 
.999 for the unrestricted model, using the translog equation and .981 and 
.992, using the equation with no interactive terms. There were 57 and 42 
degrees of freedom in the restricted and unrestricted equations using the 
translog equation and 64 and 58 degrees of freedom using the equation 
with no interactive terms. The F-statistics of 28 and 10 confirmed the 
prediction that the unrestricted model is more effective at explaining 
24 
total unit cost than is the unrestricted one, in both the translog and no 
interactive term models. The F-statistics of 4 and 21 confirmed that the 
translog function was more effective at explaining total unit costs than 
the equation with no interactive terms both excluding and including the w 
variables. This suggest although most of the interactive terms 
individually are insignificant, taken collectively they are significant. 
Therefore, one could conclude using the trans log function that worker's 
attitudes and behaviors affect costs. 
In addition, the signs of all the significant coefficients on the 
measures of worker behavior were positive which also tends to support 
the hypothesis. It was suggested that as the level of each variable 
increased costs would increase and productivity would decrease. The 
opportunity cost and the unfair labor practice parameter estimates were 
significant at the 95% level but the quit rates parameter estimate was not. 
This might suggest that quit rates is not the best measure to use when 
trying to capture the exit option of the worker. It could be insignificant 
because worker's in the automobile industry do not believe that exiting is a 
good way of behaving to show their dissatisfaction with the job. Perhaps 
the other options for behavior are what the workers use most often to 
~ IU ((j,;' tJ:e' ~;j fh.- ,rjJ/J~ ~:t- ;.;( 
12:6../( 11 0 r:0~·t/cJrj (.J/ (A 1f,'~1L 
10" 
25 
react to negative attitudes. It also suggests that people do not quit just 
because they are not satisfied with their job. They might quit because 
they are moving or have decided to pursue work in another field. 
The results from this model reinforce those discussed in earlier 
similar models that workers attitudes and behavior do significantly affect 
costs and productivity. This model goes a few steps further and tries to 
adopt theoretical work of the past into the explanation for the measures of 
attitudes and behavior. By developing this framework, this model has 
attempted to produce results which most accurately portray the attitudes 
and behaviors of the worker. 
CONCLUSION 
This model and its results gives both labor and management policy 
makers additional information to make more efficient decisions. Policy 
can not be made by ignoring the effects of the humanistic side of the 
worker. This model has shown, on a industry-wide scale, that this factor 
is important. By realizing this general notion and understanding the whole 
satisfaction, attitude and behavioral framework that has been developed, 
26 
satisfaction, attitude and behavioral framework that has been developed, 
further study and policy making decisions can be explored at the 
industry-wide and the plant level. 
At the industry wide level, research into other industries can be done. 
With this exploration comparisons might be made between industries, 
which would help in understanding more about the individual ones and 
industrial work in general. Questions such as, is the framework for 
understanding the worker in the automobile industry the same for all 
industries? If not, what are the differences and how will that affect what 
is used for the W variable in that industry's model? Obtaining these 
answers will increase the available information for policy makers within 
specific industries and throughout industrial work as a whole. 
At the plant level, development of the worker framework and seeing 
how it affects costs creates new questions. New variables can be used to 
examine the exit and voice option, such as absenteeism and grievance 
rates. A way of capturing the immeasurable behavioral reaction might be 
developed. At this level more accurate measures will certainly be 
available. By increasing the understanding of the worker framework and 
27 
how it affects costs at the much smaller plant level, labor and 
management at the plant have a good source to attempt to make decisions 
which are beneficial to both sides without leaving damaging effects to one 
party or another. 
It is foolish for a policy maker to rely on one source to make 
effective decisions. The more information that is attainable about a 
subject the easier it becomes for he or she to make the effective choice. 
Therefore, I am not proposing that what has been presented in this paper is 
the answer to making a well informed choice. I have attempted to expand 
the base and create questions for myself and others to answer to make it 
even bigger. If the assumption that the humanistic element will be most 
important for the survival of certain industries in the future is true, then 
it is vital that researchers continue to expand the base and policy makers 
use it when they make decisions. 
APPENDIX A 
Table 1: M eliminated 





ao -0.0226 -4.31 
ak 0.1611 43.79 
al 0.152 28.97 
an 0.0454 8.99 
akl -0.0192 -1.28 
akn -0.0148 -0.92 
akm -0.0371 -1. 66~-
aln 0.0383 0.37 
aIm -0.0257 -0.39 
anm -0.019 -0.28 
akt -0.0031 -2.54~ 
alt 0.0007 0.23 
ant - 0.0011 :-0.35 
at - 0.0121- -16.13 
att - 0.0004 --_." -1.07 
am 0.6415 





*The last si x p~~m~ers are 
not est i mat edj[ They are 
inferred from the restrictions. 
~v-t- ( 
I t r: 




Table 2 : K eliminated 




Value t-s tat 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
ao -0.0204 -3.84 
am 0.6395 147.36 
al 0.1583 32.58 
an 0.0493 10.51 
akl -0.0262 -1.78 
akn - 0.01 2 5 -0.8 
akm - 0.0351 -2.48 
aln 0.0567 0.57 
aIm - 0.0671 -1.31 
anm - 0.0048 - 0.09 
amt 0.0048 1.9 
alt -0.0015 -0.6 
ant -0.0005 -0. 2 
at -0.0128 -16.16 
att -0.0004 - 1.1 
ak 0.1529 
akk 0.0738 
all 0 . 0366 
ann -0.0394 
amm 0 . 1071 
akt - 0 . 00 28 
*The last six parameters are 
not estimated. They are 
inferred from the restr i ctions. 
APPENDIX A 
Table 3: L e liminated 






ao - 0.0223 -4.09 
ak 0.1609 39.7 
am 0.6379 119.57 
an 0.044 5 7.8 
akl - 0.019 2 -0.77 
akn - 0.013 -0.77 
akm -0.039 -2.67 
aln 0.0319 0.23 
aIm -0.0236 - 0.27 
anm -0.00 2 -0.03 
akt -0.003 2 - 2.16 
amt 0.00 28 0.88 
ant -0.0004 - 0.13 
at. - 0.0122 -14.99 







*The last six parameters are 
not estimated. They are 
inferred from the restrictions. 
APPENDIX A 
Table 4: N e liminated 
ESTIMATION OF THE RESTRICTED MODEL 





ao -0.0231 -4.19 
ak 0.1608 40.4 
al 0.1544 27.49 
am 0.6359 133.58 
akl - 0.0261 -1.48 
akn - 0.0099 -0.32 
akm -0 . 0359 -2.15 
aln 0.0759 0.47 
aIm - 0.0781 -1.21 
anm 0.0215 0.22 
akt -0.003 -1.94 
alt -0.0019 -0.6 
amt 0.0043 1. 31 
at - 0. 0125 -15.65 
att -0 . 0003 - 0.91 
an 0.0488 
akk 0.0719 




*The last six parameters are 
not estimated. They are 
inferred from the restrictions . 
APPENDIX B 
Table 1 : M e l iminated 






ao -0.8954 -16.99 
ak 0.1432 2 . 04 
al 0.145 2.04 
an 0.0303 0,42 
akl - 0.0244 -2.37 
akm - 0.0167 -1.62 
akn - 0.0237 -1.52 
aln 0.0402 0.91 
aIm -0.0811 -2.69 
anm -0.0213 - 0.73 
akt -0.0034 -3.17 
alt -0.0012 - 0.84 
ant -0.0012 -0.87 
at 0.016 1.3 
ltt - 0,0017 -2 .59 
aop 0.9847 15.41 
aufl 0. 2 319 7.77 -
aql- -0.0138 -0.13 
atop -0.0641 -3 .98 -
atufl 0.01 2 1 1.7 
atqr 0.0607 2 .59 
akop 0.0613 0.81 
akufl -0.0075 - 0 .32 
akqr -0.202 --2 .02 -
alop 0.0101 0.13 
alufl - 0.0083 - 0.41 
alqr 0.0792 0.68 
anop 0.0285 0.36 
anufl - 0.0044 - 0.21 





amm O. C835 
amt 0.OO5B 
amop - 0.0999 
amufl 0.0 2 0 2 
amqr 0.1548 
i 
*The l as t nine parameters are 
not e stimated. They are 
inferred from the restrictions . 
APPENDIX B 
Table 2: K eliminated 
ESTIMATION OF THE UNRESTRICTED MODEL 





a o -0.8919 -16.02 
am 0 .8525 11.82 
al 0.06708 0.92 
an -0.038 - 0.52 
akl -0.0104 -1.04 
akn - 0.0043 -0.42 
akm - 0.0519 -5.22 
aln 0.022 0.5 
aIm - 0.0579 -2.5 
anm -0.0015 -0.07 
amt 0.0042 3.26 
alt 0.0002 0.12 
ant 0.0001 0.07 
at 0.0205 1.35 
itt -0.0018 -2.57 
aop 0.9836 14.68 
aufl 0.2298 7.5 
aqr -0,0291 -0.26 
atop -0.0692 -3.72 
atufl 0.0111 1. 42 
atqr 0.0614 2.45 
arnop -0.2603 -3.33 
amufl -0.036 - 1.51 
amqr 0.0264 0.25 
alop 0.0831 1. 04 
alufl 0.018 0.76 
alqr 0.13 1. 22 
anop 0.0961 1.18 
anufl 0.0157 C).65 
anqr O.Olf8 0.14: 
ak 0 .1184 
akk 0. 0 666 
all 0.0464 
ann. 0. 0 162 
arum 0.1113 






*The last nine parameters are 
not estimated. They are 
inferred from t he restrictions. 
APPENDIX B 
Table 3: L eliminated 






ao -0.9019 - 15.18 
ak 0.0991 1. 27 
am 0.8289 10.68 
an -0.0419 -0.5 
akl -0.016 2 -0.92 
akn -0.0079 -0.72 
akm -0.0468 -4.53 
aln 0.0 0 45 0.06 
aIm -0.0108 -0.25 
anm - 0.0211 -0.72 
akt - 0.0037 -2.94 
amt 0.0034 2.21 
ant - 0.0009 -0.62 
at 0.0177 1. 21 
Itt - 0.0017 -2.31 
aop 0.9928 1.3.78 
aufl 0.2369 7.12 
aqr -0. 0 3 7 3 -0.31 
atop -0.0669 - 3.53 
atufl 0.0111 1.37 
atqr 0.0695 2.65 
akop 0.1009 1.18 
akufl 0.0035 0.13 
akqr - 0.1229 -1.23 
amop - 0.2452 -2.87 
amufl - 0. 0 27 -1.04 
amqr 0.1084 0.9 
anop 0.0988 1. 08 
anufl 0.0186 0.68 
anqr 0.0038 0.03 
al 0.1139 








*The last nine parameters are 
not estimated. They are 
inferred from the restrictions . 
APPENDIX B 
Table 4: N e liminated 






ao -0.8934 -14.59 
ak 0.0845 1. 06 
al -0.0098 -0.15 
am 0 .7927 9.87 
akl -0. 00 55 - 0.52 
akm -0.0 2 34 -1.23 
akn -0.04 5 7 -4.14 
aln 0.0685 0.97 
aIm -0.0771 -2.53 
anm 0.0 3 07 0.75 
akt -0.0034 -2.51 
alt - 0.0003 - 0 .16 
amt 0.0039 2.4 
at 0.0167 1. 08 
att - 0.0016 -2.19 
aop 0.9849 13.29 
aufl 0.2316 6.45 
aqr -0.0336 -0.25 
atop - 0.066 -3.26 
atufl 0.0118 1.4 
atqr 0,0707 2.42 
akap 0.1142 1.31 
akufl 0.0071 0.26 
akqr -0.0987 - 0.92 
alop 0.1642 2.17 ... ,- ~ 
alufl 0.0 3 61 1.42 
alqr 0.1679 1. 34 
amop -0.2015 -2.3 
amufl -0.0196 -0.73 
amqr 0.07 58 c) . 63 




arnm 0 . 0 921 
ant - 0.0002 
anop -- 0 . 0769 
anufl -0.0 2 36 
anqr - 0. H:5 
*The last nine parameters are 
not estimated . ~hey are 
inferred from the restrictions . 
APPENDIX C 
Table 1: M eliminated 






! ao -0.03 -6.8 
~ ak 0.1697 42.13 
'7, al O. t496 36.1 
,J an 0.0427 10.31 
:; akt - 0.0072 -9.47 
(; alt 0.0029 3.69 
r, ant 0.0006 0.77 




Table 2 : K e liminated 






ao -0. 0 281 -6 . 43 
am 0.6384 173 . 39 
al 0.1526 41.27 
an 0.0457 12.33 
amt 0.0035 4.98 
alt 0.0027 3.89 
-ant 0.0005 0.7 
at - 0.01 22 -14.65 
ak 0.16 32 
akt - 0.0066 
APPENDIX C 
Table 3 : L eliminated 






ao -0.0292 -5.97 
ak 0.1691 39.04 
am 0.6351 143.32 
an 0.042 2 9.5 
akt - 0.0071 -8.87 
amt 0.0037 4.38 
ant 0.0008 0.9 3 
at - 0.012 -12.77 
al 0.1537 
a lt 0.0026 
APPENDIX C 
Table 4: N eliminated 





ao -0.0301 -6.11 
ak 0.1694 38.2 
al 0.1493 32.93 
am 0.6354 140.44 
akt - 0.0071 -8.68 
alt 0.003 3.43 
amt 0.0038 4.42 




Table 1: M eliminated 
ESTIMATION OF THE UNRESTRICTED MODEL 
Estimated 
Parameter Value t.-st.at. 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
ao -0.9166 -7.92 
ak 0.1726 61.43 
al 0.1491 52.94 
an 0.0426 15.11 
akt -0.0074 --13.63 
alt 0.003 5.5 
ant 0.0008 1. 45 
at 0.01 25 0.5 
~-~~- ':lOp 1.0 23 7.16 j 
/ 
aufl 0. 2 481 4.03 
aqr - 0. 2 008 -0.87 
atop - 0.0504 - 1.45 
::,- atufl - 0.005 2 -0.8 
!", atqr 0.0914 1. 88 





Table 2: K eliminated 
ESTIMATION OF THE UNRESTRICTED MODEL 
==================================== 
Estimated 
Parameter Value t-stat 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
ao -0.9 23 -10 
am 0.6 3 58 289.83 
al 0.1494 68.19 
an 0.0428 19.55 
amt 0.0036 8.51 
alt 0.003 7.02 
ant 0.0008 1. 82 
at 0.0124 0.61 
aop 1.0285 9.06 
auf 1 0.2531 5.25 
aqr - 0.2014 -1.11 
atop - 0.0506 -1.83 
atufl - 0.0053 -0.98 
atqr 0.09 2 8 2.44 
ak 0. 1 72 
akt 0.0073 
APPENDIX D 
Table 3 : L eliminated 






ao -0.9391 -7.19 
ak 0.1726 54.55 
am 0.6355 200.08 
an 0.0425 13.38 
akt -0.0073 - 12.07 
amt 0.0036 5.93 
ant 0.0008 1.3 
at 0.0128 0.45 
aop 1.0441 6.47 
aufl 0.2608 3.76 
aqr -0 . 1991 -0.76 
atop -0. 0 515 - 1.31 
atufl -0.0055 -0.75 
atqr 0.0945 1.73 
al 0.1495 
alt 0.0029 
APPENDI X D 
Table 4: N e liminated 
ESTIMATION OF THE UNRESTRICTED MODEL 
Estimated 
Parameter Value t-stat 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
ao -0.923 -6.84 
ak 0.1726 52.76 
al 0.149 45.38 
am 0.6355 193.54 
akt -0.0074 -11 . 71 
alt 0.003 4.72 
amt 0.00 3 6 5.72 
at 0.0041 0 .14 
aop 1.0511 6.31 
aufl 0.2344 3.27 
aqr -0.2921 - 1.08 
atop -0.0378 -0.93 
atufl -0.0042 -0.55 
atqr 0.0762 1. 35 
an 0.043 
,.'';.\ "i~ ant 0.0008 
APPENDIX E 
Zellner's method for seemingly unrelated equations allows all the 
equations to be estimated simultaneously using a matrix instead of each 
one seperately. Taken as one equation instead of four, there are 72 
observations instead of 18. The number of variables do not increase 
because there are no parameters that appear in the share equations that 
are not in the cost function. Therefore, there are still 15 parameters to be 
estimated. This step increases the degrees of freedom from three in 
estimating the restricted cost function alone to 57 in estimating both the 
cost function and share equations simultaneously. 
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Harvard University Press, 1970 
20 Norsworthy and Zabala "Worker Attitudes" p.551 
I • 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Hamermesh, Daniel. "Economic Aspects of Job Satisfaction" Essays in 
labor Market Analysis. New York. Halstead Press, 1977. 
Hirschman, Albert. Exit. Voice. and loyalty. Cambridge, Mass. 
Harvard University Press, 1970 . 
. Hunter, Jeffery. Structural Change in the U.S. Automobile Industry. 
lexington, Mass. lexington Books, 1983. 
Industrial Relations Research Association Series. U.S. Industrial 
Relations 1950-1980; A critical Assessment. Bloomington, IL. Portagraph 
Printing, 1981. 
Katz, Harry C. Shifting Gears. Cambridge, Mass. The MIT Press, 
1985. 
Katz, Kochan and Gobielle. "Industrial Relations Performance, 
Economic Performance, and aWL Programs; An Interplant Analysis" 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review. October, 1983. 
Mathews, Robert. Labor Relations and the Law. Boston, Mass. Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1953. 
MIT International Automobile Program. The Future of the Automobile. 
Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press, 1985. 
National Labor Relations Board. "Annual Reports of the NLRB". 
Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959-76. 
Norsworthy and Zabala. "Workers Attitudes, Worker Behavior, and 
Productivity In the U.S. Automobile Industry, 1959-1976" Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review. July, 1985. 
Norsworthy and Zabala. "Worker Attitudes and the Cost of Production; 
Hypothesis Tests in an Equilibrium Model" Working Paper. 1983. 
Tetsuo, Sakiya. Honda Motors. New York, NY. Kodansha International, 
1982. 
u.s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Annual Survey of 
Manufactures. Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967-82. 
u.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor-Management Relations and 
Cooperative Programs. "Case Studies and Reports" Washington D.C., U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1980-88. 
u.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employment. 
Hours. and Earnings. United States. 1909-1984, Volume I. Washington D.C. 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985. 
Winston, Clifford. Blind Intersection. Washington D.C. The Brookings 
Institute, 1987 
Zellner, Arnold. "An Efficient Method of Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions and Tests for Aggregation Bias" Journal of the American 
Statistical Association. June, 1962. 
